UK election manifestos make promises on security and foreign policy – but tough choices await a new government

London: Domestic issues have dominated debate so far in the UK election. But the campaign has also seen both Conservatives and Labour seeking to portray themselves as guarantors of security in a more troubled world. The Liberal Democrats have also used this theme, being highly critical of the government’s record on defence.

This similar framing reflects the UK’s difficult security situation – with war in Europe, the prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency in the US, and a more contested world shaped by the growth of authoritarian powers.

Yet despite the seriousness of the threats the manifestos diagnose, their goals are in many cases limited and cautious.

This is likely a consequence of the fiscal bind the UK is in. Unless the next government raises taxes or makes cuts somewhere, it will be hard to get the UK’s debt-to-GDP ratio falling while meeting existing plans for public spending – let alone find additional resources for defence and foreign affairs.

The parties and the manifestos acknowledged this to some extent. But on some big foreign affairs issues, they swerve strategic questions.

To confront Russia and play a leading role in NATO the UK may need to consider moving closer to states like Poland who spend over 3 per cent on defence.

They may see little electoral benefit in addressing them now. But they will need to be answered by a future government – potentially in a forthcoming defence or foreign policy review, which some parties promise.

The three main parties propose to maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons system, spend 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence – though in different timeframes – meet commitments to NATO and continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine. The Liberal Democrats also said they would build back the UK’s Army to 100,000 troops, from a current level of around 73,000.

But to confront Russia and play a leading role in NATO the UK may need to consider moving closer to states like Poland who spend over 3 per cent on defence. 2.5 per cent of GDP is likely to only fill existing gaps for the current Defence Equipment Plan (the UK Ministry of Defence’s ten year spending plan for equipment and support).

The fiscal trade-offs needed to meet this target are punishing. But the UK could also spend its money better.

The UK was either the fourth or sixth biggest military spender in the world in 2023 (depending on the measure used), yet successive parliamentary committees and other analyses have warned that the UK’s Armed Forces face serious capability and stockpile shortages, personnel retention issues, and procurement problems.

All three major parties commit to improving these issues. But even with increased spending, a future government must make hard choices and reduce the range of capabilities and programmes the UK military maintains. Recruitment and retention too, is not just about funding, but also making the armed forces an attractive career prospect.

A new government should build on the new approach to procurement the MOD announced in February, focused on simpler requirements and quicker, more transparent procurement.

A future government must also acknowledge the way defence is changing – with unmanned weapons and low-cost, off-the-shelf software and hardware making a significant impact on Ukraine’s battlefields. Ukraine has also exposed Europe’s more broadly insufficient defence industrial capacity.

Some of this is hinted at in the manifestos. Labour promises a defence industrial strategy. The government’s recent Defending Britain policy paper also refers to giving more certainty to the defence industry. But a more radical overhaul may be needed.

A new government should build on the new approach to procurement the MOD announced in February, focused on simpler requirements and quicker, more transparent procurement, working with a mix of smaller and larger industry partners – although given the role of long-held assumptions and path dependencies in defence planning and procurement, the transition will take time.

Security cooperation with the EU is one area where UK parties do set out different stalls. The Conservatives promise stronger bilateral relationships and to work with the EU on Ukraine. The Liberal Democrats (who set out a pathway to rejoining the single market) also promise further cooperation on defence and foreign policy. Labour say they will seek a new UK–EU security pact, but this proposal – as for the other parties – is still light on detail.

Ukraine has arguably created a more conducive climate for UK–EU security cooperation, and the EU may be open to building links on this terrain. But beyond basic steps like increasing regular consultation, it’s unclear what this might look like.

Increasing defence industrial capacity could be an area for cooperation – including in bolstering European contributions to NATO, helping to account for an increasingly unpredictable US.

But EU initiatives like the European Defence Industrial Strategy are currently aimed at bolstering industries in EU member states and generally exclude third countries, including the UK. This could stymie any push to create a wider European defence industrial base that features the UK.

The UK’s last strategic statement on its foreign policy – the 2021 Integrated Review – was criticized by some for its limited acknowledgement of the UK’s European relationships. A refresh in 2023 made more substantial references to working with EU partners on security.

Labour have made statements suggesting they might undertake a new foreign policy review if elected. How to far to pursue shared UK–EU defence industrial initiatives will be a key question for any such review.

The manifestos make numerous other commitments, including on China, the Middle East and nuclear policy. On the UK’s role in addressing global challenges, including poverty and climate change, all three parties commit to eventually returning to 0.7 per cent spending of Gross National Income on development, though only the Liberal Democrats say they will do so immediately.

Several party leaders have acknowledged that both increased geopolitical competition and the climate transition are making relationships with middle powers and the Global South more strategically important – and shifting the global trade order.