Italy can play a role in the Indo-Pacific—but must do it its own way

Lorenzo Termine

Rome: While many Europeans are understandably focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine right now, leaders also know that global stability in the years ahead will almost certainly hinge on what happens in the Indo-Pacific, a region that includes more than half of the world’s population and economic output.

Italy is one of the major European powers that does recognize the importance of the Indo-Pacific, and its recent naval deployments to the region show that Rome is serious about playing a role in its security.

But Italy needs to do so in a way that is sustainable, consistent, and makes use of its specific military expertise and capabilities. It will also need to carry out its Indo-Pacific strategy while keeping Euro-Mediterranean security as its top priority. Perhaps most important, Italy must avoid several possible pitfalls ahead that could hamper its efforts. A successful approach means not simply doing more in the Indo-Pacific. It means doing more of the right things that play to Italy’s strengths.

Italy has significantly expanded its Indo-Pacific engagement through military deployments, air force cooperation, and defense industry initiatives. In 2023, the ITS Morosini visited nineteen ports and participated in multinational exercises, followed in 2024 by the ITS Montecuccoli joining the Rim of the Pacific and Pacific Dragon exercises while assisting US-led maritime operations. During drills in the past year, the Cavour carrier strike group achieved initial operating capability with its F-35B jets in the Indo-Pacific. And there are rumors that Italy is in discussions to sell the aircraft carrier Garibaldi to Indonesia, which could further cement its defense-industrial presence in the region. Italy’s air force reinforced its presence with the 2024 “Indo-Pacific Jump” mission, deploying F-35A jets to Japan for bilateral and trilateral exercises.

So far this year, the ITS Antonio Marceglia has deployed to the region, and the Italian and Philippine navies have engaged in early talks about new defense collaboration.

In terms of industrial cooperation, the Global Combat Air Programme, launched with Japan and the United Kingdom in 2022, strengthens Italy’s defense ties. Meanwhile, Italian defense companies are also deepening links with Malaysia, Indonesia, and other countries in the region.

Three principles for a sustainable Indo-Pacific policy

Italy’s challenge will be to build on these efforts by crafting Indo-Pacific policies that are effective, coherent, sustainable, and do not neglect the growing instability in Europe and the Mediterranean. To achieve this, Rome should focus on three pitfall-avoiding principles.

Don’t confuse tactics for strategy. In terms of how Italy should be approaching the region, the Indo-Pacific is about strategy, not tactics. Rome should not confuse committing to Indo-Pacific security with mere tactical bargaining with the United States or China. The subject is strategic for two major reasons. First, given the size of regional actors and the typical risks associated with power transitions, Italian involvement in Indo-Pacific security should be about Rome’s role in the world going forward. In an increasingly Indo-Pacific-driven world, Italy should not posture toward the region as a mere result of US pressures to contain China. First and foremost, it should take actions designed to maintain its relevance in world affairs and live by the commitments it makes.

Devoting more attention to regional security has grand strategic implications given the structural pressures the Indo-Pacific is subjected to, such as great-power competition, shifting military alliances, security dilemmas, military-technological interplay, nuclear ambitions, and legacy patterns of enmity. Italy should be aware that alignments and security contributions in the Indo-Pacific have meaningful strategic effects, even for a distant middle power.

Having grand strategic implications, the Indo-Pacific is not only about one country or a handful of them. Italy’s Indo-Pacific engagement has heavily relied on established partners, such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan. While these partnerships remain essential, Italy should diversify its regional relationships with states and organizations. Deepening security relations with powers such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia could expand Italy’s influence and reduce its dependence on a few key partners.

Don’t overstretch military capabilities. Italy’s increased military involvement in the Indo-Pacific reflects its broader historical alignment with US and NATO military operations and commitments. The country has, for example, been one of the most active contributors to Western-led initiatives. Recent efforts to expand Italy’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific further solidify this role.

However, so far this shift has occurred with minimal public debate, and Italy’s strategic decision to focus resources on this faraway region has sparked concerns about potential negative repercussions. Italy’s military, one of NATO’s most heavily deployed forces, is already stretched thin. It operates in Africa, Asia, the Arctic, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe.

Despite these far-reaching commitments, Italy lags in defense spending, particularly in essential areas such as training and maintenance. A large share of Italy’s defense budget is allocated toward personnel, limiting what is spent on equipment, upkeep, and other categories. Spreading its forces too thin weakens Italy’s readiness—especially as Mediterranean instability grows and as the United State reconsiders its role in European security under President Donald Trump. Ahead of the NATO Summit in The Hague in June, Italy is bracing for growing pressure to spend more on the Alliance’s defense. This will surely impact Rome’s Indo-Pacific engagement in the future.

The inescapable implication for Italy is that a risky security trade-off may materialize. With NATO focusing on the eastern European front and its attention on the southern flank diminishing, and with the United States potentially absorbed by efforts to contain China, Italy’s involvement in Mediterranean security becomes increasingly vital. But diverting attention and resources from the region could have undesired consequences. A problem of sustainability may appear sooner than expected given that Italy may send its carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific again in 2026, based on the rotation commitment it made at the Paris Naval Conference in 2024.

Don’t take a FONOPs-centric approach. While some navies rely heavily on freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Indo-Pacific, Italy should instead promote a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to the region’s security, one that compliments the capabilities and expertise of other allies and partners. The Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly polarized and securitized, subject to structural pressures and an escalating security dilemma. In this context, military capabilities aim to dissuade adversaries from taking hostile actions (at best) or compelling weaker actors to comply with demands (at worst).

Coercion is increasingly becoming the defining feature of interstate relations in the region. In this context, Italy should not forget that FONOPs—like many other shows of force—are meant to signal resolve but can also be easily interpreted as coercive.

Capacity building vis-à-vis Italy’s security partners in the Indo-Pacific is a constructive contribution to regional security. Italy can field a monumental array of non-escalatory and significant security assets and tools to contribute to partner states’ security. This should be done not only because it can help numb escalatory responses but also because Rome boasts valuable security expertise in many different domains. Lessons learned during Italy’s several military missions since the end of the Cold War may be vital for the Indo-Pacific, as well. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Italy developed significant capabilities in training and advising missions. Beyond the traditional three—the navy, air force, and army—the Carabinieri (Italian gendarmerie force), the Guardia di Finanza (customs and tax police), Guardia Costiera (coast guard police), and the Polizia Postale (cybercrime and communication security) can all play a role in Indo-Pacific states’ security.

Italy’s Indo-Pacific policy is an evolving feature of its broader international strategy. Moving forward, Rome should focus on a pragmatic approach that balances regional commitments with national priorities. By strengthening targeted partnerships and ensuring resource sustainability, Italy can contribute effectively to Indo-Pacific partners’ and regional security while securing its strategic base well within the Mediterranean.