Italy: How the new government can influence the EU’s approach to China

Rome’s ‘Italy First’ approach to China will not necessarily undermine EU strategy on the country, and it could even strengthen it

Francesca Ghiretti

Rome: During Italy’s general election campaign this year, the country’s future prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, signalled a strongly sceptical position on China. In an unusual move for a candidate for the premiership, she took part in an interview with Taiwan’s Central News Agency. She also promised a review of China’s global infrastructure investment programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for which Italy signed a memorandum of understanding in 2019 – a decision she deems a “big mistake”.

Italy’s coalition government is made up of Meloni’s far-right Brothers of Italy, Matteo Salvini’s League, and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. The three parties have a diverse track record of preferences towards China. In government, they have inflated their narratives (either for or against China) but then failed to follow through on their actions, which have tended to be much more in line with the approach of other European countries. Brothers of Italy is now governing for the first time, but for the moment it indeed appears to be acting much more moderately than it sounded on the campaign trail.

The first months of the new government have shown a high degree of continuity on China between Meloni’s administration and that of her predecessor. Mario Draghi adopted a position in keeping with the European Union’s assessment of the country as “an economic competitor and a systemic rival.” For example, it blocked or prevented the acquisition of Italian enterprises by Chinese companies and strengthened transatlantic alignment.

Meloni and Xi Jinping may have held a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 in Bali this year, but this means little for Italy’s wider overall policy approach. The meeting was friendlier than could have been expected for a European leader who just a few weeks earlier was vocally condemning Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait. Meloni also accepted Xi’s invitation to visit Beijing. But this too is not a sign of Italy cosying up to China, but one of re-establishing a regular type of diplomatic relationship. Visits to China are hardly off the cards for European leaders: shortly before the Bali gathering, Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, became the first G7 leader to go to China since the outbreak of covid-19.

The same applies to another part of Meloni’s coalition. The new foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, is a Forza Italia nominee and comes from a China-sceptic background. In 2019, as president of the European Parliament, Tajani opposed Italy’s decision to sign the BRI memorandum of understanding. Shortly after the G20, Tajani had a phone call with China’s foreign minister, the content of which amounted to the usual diplomatic formulas around strengthening economic relations, but little more. The era of big deals and high-level signing ceremonies are long gone. Equally, there is little indication the Italian government will do anything to hamper the export to China of Italian goods.